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Segregation of Poor and Minority Children into
Classes for the Mentally Retarded by the
Use of IQ Tests*
I.

AN

OVERVIEW

According to Lloyd A. Dunn, past president of the Council fo1
Exceptional Children, about sixty to eighty per cent of the students
in the nation's mentally retarded classes are "children from low
status backgrounds-including Afro-Americans, American Indians,
Mexicans, and Puerto Rican Americans; those from non-standard
English speaking, broken, disorganized and inadequate homes; [and]
children from other non-middle class environments." 1
His estimate is supported by several empirical studies. In California, Mexican-American children comprise only thirteen per cent
of the state's school population, but in 1967, they accounted for almost
thirty per cent of the special education students.2 Similarly, a recent
survey of eleven Missouri school districts disclosed that learning
disability (LD) programs, which are remedial in nature, are predominantly filled wth white, middle- and upper-class children, while
educable mentally retarded (EMR) programs, which are compensatory in nature, have disproportionate numbers of black children.3
Specifically, while white children comprised 96.78 per cent of the
students in LD classes, in the EMR classes blacks constituted 34.21
per cent of the enrollment.4 Disproportionate numbers of blacks and
other minority students in EMR classes seem to be the rule rather
than the exception.5
In most schools, intelligence tests are the sole-or at least the
predominant-criterion used by officials in labeling students mentally retarded and in relegating them to EMR classes. 6 There has
been mounting criticism in educational circles of the use of these
" Portions of this Comment were prepared for the Institute for the Study of Mental
Retardation and Related Disabilities, Ann Arbor, Michigan, and are to be published
by the Institute as part of a larger study under the supervision of Dr. William Rhodes.
l. Dunn, Special Education for the Mildly Retarded-Is Much of It Justifiable?, 35
EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 5, 6 (1968).
2. J. Mercer, Current Retardation Procedures and the Psychological and Social
Implications on the Mexican American: A Position Paper 2 (1970) (available on Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC) microfiche Ed No. 052 848).
3. Franks, Ethnic and Social Status Characteristics of Children in EMR and LD
Classes, 37 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 537 (1971).
4. Id. at 537.
5. For example, in Ann Arbor, Michigan, where blacks constitute only 11.1 per cent
of the total school enrollment, they presently make up 40 per cent of the city's EMR
classes. Figures provided by Ruth Zweifler, Ann Arbor Special Education Department,
Advisory Commission on Special Educational Needs.
6. See F. WEINTRAUB, A. ABESON, & D. BRADDOCK, STATE LAW &: EDUCATION OF HANDICAPPED CHILDREN; ISSUES

&: RECOMMENDATIONS 28 (1971).
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standardized intelligence tests as EMR placement determinants
for minority children. For example, Dr. Henry S. Dyer, former
vice-president of the Educational Testing Service, feels that IQ
and grade-equivalent scores are "psychological and statistical monstrosities." He also feels that, while both IQ and grade equivalency scores are purported to be based on a representative national
sampling of students, they actually are not. Test makers fail to
sample many different kinds of schools, and the sampling upon which
the "average" is based is frequently biased against blacks because
test makers do not use data from black schools.7
This Comment deals with the inadequacies of IQ tests as devices
for identifying those children who are to be relegated to classes for
the mentally retarded and with the constitutional ramifications of
these inadequacies. The present use of standardized tests may violate
due process and equal protection guarantees. Additionally, certain
procedural due process requirements, heretofore ignored in this context, may apply to the placement process.
At the outset certain definitional problems must be examined.
First, within the field of mental retardation a controversy exists over
what abilities should be included in a definition of mental retardation,8 just as there is disagreement over the definition of intelligence
in general. 0 Second, a controversy revolves around whether it is possible or necessary to evaluate intellectual factors independently of
emotional factors. Some psychological theorists, such as L.M. Terman and Maud A. Merrill, have attempted to measure a child's
optimal intellectual level as independently as possible from his general personality adjustment. Their tests, the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales, were designed to encourage the test taker to minimize
his personality handicaps and respond with the best intellectual
capacity he has developed.10 On the other hand, David Wechsler,
author of the ·wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC), proposed a more global view of intelligence, which includes a somewhat
greater proportion of what is ordinarily labeled "personality."11
Third, there remains some disagreement over whether a definition
of mental retardation should refer to potential ability or to present
functioning ability. The general agreement seems to be that esti7. Telephone conversation with Dr. Henry S. Dyer, June 7, 1973.
8. H. RODINSON&: N. RODINSON, THE MENTALLY luTARDED CHILD: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
APPROACH 28 (1965).
9. Id.
10. Teague, Educational Information, in MENTAL luTARDATION, DIAGNOSIS AND
TREATMENT 53, 56 (D. Poser ed. 1969).
11. Id. One commentator has pointed out, "These two popular approaches to individual intelligence testing differ subtly: for example, speed is a more important factor
in Wechsler's tests than in the Stanford-Binet, ••• and the child who is cautious
••• and wants to be certain of his answer may be penalized on the Wechsler scale."
H. RODINSON &: N. RODINSON, supra note 8, at 28-29.
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mates of potential ability are subject to serious enor. 12 In addition,
it is now agreed that a useful definition of mental retardation must
rest upon estimates of the present abilities of the child. 13 However,
those who still define mental retardation as incurable tend to place
greater emphasis on an estimate of potential growth.14
These problems of definition are most troublesome in dealing
with the placement of the educable mentally retarded, since "the
intellectual handicaps of these children are not so great as to determine their level of adjustment in every sphere." 15 In contrast, in the
case of severely retarded children, most of whom have neurological
difficulties, it matters little whether mental retardation is considered
in terms of capacity to learn, knowledge possessed, social adaptation,
or personal adjustment, since these children have greatly limited
capacities in all these areas.16
From a legal standpoint, however, these controversies need not
be definitively resolved. First, regardless of what definition of mental
retardation is employed, the fact remains that tests purporting to
measure intelligence are being used to a significant degree as a basis
for the placement of minority group children into EMR classes.
These tests may have built-in cultural and social biases that could
result in the discriminatory and unfair placement of minority group
children into such classes.17 Second, regardless of the theoretical controversy surrounding intelligence and mental retardation, it appears
that the de facto basis for placing children in EMR classes, as reflected in the general practice of those engaged in the placement decisions, is potential ability.18 The remedial (LD) class is designed for
12. H. ROBINSON &: N. ROBINSON, supra note 8, at 29.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 27.
16. Id. at 27-28.
17. See notes 22-28 infra and accompanying te.xt.
18. This proposition is extremely difficult to support by reference to the educational
literature, not because there exists a great deal of material supporting a contrary view
-in fact, there appears to be none-but because this proposition has been such a basic
assumption since EMR classes were first instituted in the United States that the educational writers have seldom needed to restate it. The comments of at least one writer,
however, are revealing. He writes:
The theory behind the homogenous placement of children into a special class and
the labelling of the class as special, is that the goals of the teacher would be geared
to not only the group's present functioning, but also each student's potential functioning. This functioning is seen as limited at the retarded level on almost all of
their special abilites. Only those children who are functionally retarded in the
present and are expected to be functionally retarded in the future, no matter
what experiences they have in school, should be candidates for these special classes.
However, • • . this is not the current practice in many school districts, even
though the four most commonly used individual intelligence tests are designed to
indicate present overall functioning ability and also future potential.
Tuckman, The Placement of Pseudo-Retarded Children in Classes for Mentally Retarded, 7 ACADEMIC THERAPY 165, 165-66 (1971). See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1076a (Supp. 1973).
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children who have learning disabilities, such as speech defects, reading problems, or the like, that cause them to achieve at a lower level
than regular children but can be corrected. 19 EMR classes, however,
are designed for children who have the capacity to learn only up to a
certain undefined point, a point always decidedly lower than the
corresponding point for regular children.20 This discussion is concerned with only the latter type of class, regardless of its local name.
The standardized tests used to place children into these classes
are subject to at least three inadequacies. The first is that the two
tests most widely used throughout the country21-the Stanford-Binet
Intelligence Scale22 and the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children23-do not provide sufficiently meaningful information about
the learning capability of the minority students tested to permit
their use in so critical a decision as EMR placement. The StanfordBinet test was originally standardized in 1937 by giving the test to
3,184 subjects, every one of whom was a white, native-born American;24 the revision in 1960 again included only whites. 25 Also,
19. The proposition that the disabilities of LD children can be corrected is
substantiated by reference to the educational literature. Typical among statements
found is the following: "A learning disability refers to a retardation, disorder, or delayed development in one or more of the processes of speech, language, reading, writing,
arithmetic, or other school subjects resulting from a psychological handicap caused by
a possible cerebral dysfunction and/or emotional or behavioral disturbances. It is not
the result of mental retardation, sensory deprivation, or cultural or instructional factors." Kirk &: Bateman, Diagnosis and Remediation of Learning Disabilities, 29 Ex.CEPTIONAL CHILDREN 73 (1962). See also Bateman, Learning Disabilities-Yesterday, Today
and Tomorrow, in PROBLEMS AND lssUES IN THE EDUCATION OF Ex.CEPTIONAL CHILDREN
292 (R. Jones ed. 1971).
20. See note 18 supra. EMR children are thought to develop at roughly one half
to three fourths the rate of normal children and usually score between 50 and 75 on
a standardized intelligence test, where an IQ score of 100 ostensibly indicates average
intelligence. See G. KIMBLE&: N. GAIU,IEZY, PRINCIPLES OF GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY 511-12
(3d ed. 1968).
21. Teague, supra note 10, at 56-57.
22. The scale is an intelligence scale designed to cover the levels of mental development from age two to adult. Levels are graduated in difficulty. Below the six-year
mental age level most test items are of the performance (nonverbal) type-for example,
matching and reproducing figures. From age six to adult, test items become more verbal
and abstractly based and require skills in verbal reasoning power, word definitions,
and deductive-inductive reasoning. Standardization of the Binet test has been extensive. See generally L. TERMAN &: M. MERRILL, STANFORD-BINEr INTELLIGENCE SCALE:
MANUAL FOR THE TIDRD REVISION (1960).
23. The WISC, like the Stanford-Binet test, is based on the theory that psychometric (intelligence testing) evaluation should provide a measure of general mental
ability. Generally, the instrument is used to evaluate students between eight and fifteen
years of age, although the test's lower limits extend below this range. Items are not
grouped by difficulty level. The WISC's ten subtests are classified as either verbal or
performance scale tests. Scores are provided for each major classification in addition
to a total or Full Scale IQ score. Like the Binet, the WISC has been subjected to extensive research. Standardization procedures have also been extensive. See generally
D. WECHSLER, 'WECHSLER INTELLIGENCE SCALE FOR CHILDREN: MANUAL (1949).
24. L. TEIU,IAN &: M. l\!ERRILL, supra note 22, at 9.
25. The 1937 Stanford-Binet was in use 23 years before being replaced by what
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children were excluded if their father did not live in the home or
was unemployed. 26 In addition to a racial bias, these factors indicate
a probable economic bias in the standardization, for poor children
often come from families with absent or unemployed fathers. The
WISC test is similarly racially suspect in that it was standardized
by testing 2,200 subjects, all of whom were white. 27
It is important to note that the test score is a statement of how
an individual student compares with the mean score of the norming
group; the mean is supposed to reflect an average ability to learn,
while a score above or below it indicates superior or inferior ability.
A critical assumption is that the individual tested is fairly comparable with the norming group in terms of environmental background and psychological make-up; to the extent that the individual
is not comparable, the test score may reflect those differences rather
than the student's capabilities. Indeed, the creator of the WISC
clearly perceived the limitations of tests normed only on whites:
We have eliminated the "colored" v. "white" factor by admitting at
the outset that our norms cannot be used for the colored population
of the United States. Though we have tested a large number of
colored persons, our standardization is based upon white subjects
only. We omitted the colored population from our first standardization because we did not feel that norms derived by mixing the
populations could be interpreted without special provisos and reservations.28
Dr. Robert Williams has termed "its racist twin"-the 1960 Form L-M Revision. The
latter used 4498 subjects in the normative sample, none of whom were black. See
Williams, From Dehumanization to Black Intellectual Genocide: A Rejoinder, CLINICAL
CHILD PSYCHOLOGY NEWSLE'ITER, Fall 1970, at 6.
26. See L. TERMAN &: M. MERRILL, :MEASURING INTELLIGENCE 13-15 (1937).
27. D. WECHSLER, supra note 23, at 7. There has been no restandardization.
28. D. WECHSLER, THE MEASUREMENT OF .ADULT INTELLIGENCE 107 (1944).
Additionally, many researchers have written extensively on the biases inherent in
the IQ tests that should preclude their appropriateness for comparing racial groups.
For example, Garcia pointed out several biases that are summarized as follows: (1)
Test items are generally from the school curriculum (reading, writing, and arithmetic)
and exclude musical, artistic, mechanical, and other abilities. Thus, he concludes that
the Stanford-Binet is actually a measure of scholastic-performance ability, not general
intelligence. (2) IQ tests are so tied to school curriculum that after about age 17 raw IQ
falls gradually, indicating that unless one is in constant contact with school curriculum,
school-related items become more difficult and scores decline. However, scores of those
who remain in the academic world increase. (3) Although IQ scores generally decline
over time, ability to get along in nonacademic social settings often improves. This
aspect of intelligence is not incorporated into IQ tests. (4) For preschoolers, test items
relate to ability to recognize toys, items from the home environment which are more
likely to be found in middle- and upper-class homes. (5) Although there is adequate
precedent for constructing IQ tests that consider the cultural environment of minority
group children, such construction has not been done. The precedent for such con•
struction comes from the following: ·when males and females were shown to perform
differently on specified subtests-males better on speed and coordination, females
better on verbal tests-the constructors of the Stanford-Binet and other IQ tests omitted
any test item that strongly favored one sex and balanced the items that slightly favored
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The second inadequacy is that environmental, psychological, and
socioeconomic factors have a significant effect on the test results.
With respect to environmental factors, a major handicap is that the
language forms spoken in black and lower-class environments are
alien to the standard English used in the intelligence tests. 29 There
is also less exposure in these environments to books and other
educational materials.3° Consequently, both the content and verbal
style of the test may be foreign to the minority child.31 With respect
to psychological and socioeconomic factors, disadvantaged children,
whether black or white, are likely to suffer from low self-esteem and
lack of self-confidence in the schoolroom setting. Black children are
often imbued with a sense of worthlessness, inferiority, fear, and
despair, transmitted to them at an early age by their parents and
reinforced by experiences in the community.32
one sex with tl1ose that slightly favored the other. See Garcia, IQ: The Conspiracy,
6 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 40 (1972).
Research by Jane Mercer of the University of California at Riverside has also
provided significant evidence of the cultural bias of IQ tests. Her most recent research
has shown that the relationship between socioeconomic factors and IQ is such that
by knowing tlie cultural background and socioeconomic status of a child, one can
predict IQ scores for an average group. Using a sample of more than 1500 children,
Mercer found specific characteristics tllat were significantly more likely to be present
in those children who did better on IQ tests.
She found, for example, tllat black children with tlle highest !Q's came from
families where the mothers wanted tl1e children to be educated beyond high school,
the parents were married and homeowners, tllere were fewer than tllree children, and
other white, middle-class phenomenon were present. After selecting tlie five characteristics most strongly related to IQ for blacks and another five for chicanos and after
giving a score to each of the 578 chicano and 339 black children according to tlle
number of white, middle-class characteristics his family manifested, she found tliat
tlie more white and middle-class characteristics possessed by tlle family, the higher
tlle child's IQ. The average black child's IQ, witllout controlling for cultural factors,
was 90.5; when tlle black child's family matched none or one white, middle-class characteristic, tlie average IQ was 82.7; and when it matched on all five characteristics, tlle
average IQ was 99.5, tlle national norm. Thus, Mercer concluded tllat when socioeconomic status and cultural background are controlled, tliere are no differences in
intelligence between the groups. See J. Mercer, Pluralistic Diagnosis in tlle Evaluation
of Black and Chicano Children: A Procedure for Taking Socio-cultural Variables into
Account in Clinical Assessment, Paper Presented at American Psychological Association
Annual Convention, Sept. 3-7, 1971 (available on Educational Resources Information
Center (ERIC) microfiche Ed No. 055 145).
29. R. HURLEY, PoVERlY AND MENTAL RETARDATION, A CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP 80-81
(1969); F. RIESSMAN, THE CULTURALLY DEPRIVED CHILD 75-79 (1962).
30. R. HURLEY, supra note 29, at 82-83.
31. A few sample test questions illustrate tlie problem tllat tlle minority
and/or lower-class child encounters witll respect to content. The General Information
Section of tlie 'WISC test, for example, asks "Who wrote Romeo and Juliet?" and
"What is tlle color of rubies?" The General Comprehension Section asks, "Why is
it better to pay a bill by check tlian by cash?"-a very difficult question for a child
whose parents have never had a bank account. The test also asks children to identify
"C.O.D.," "hieroglyphic," and "Genghis Khan." D. "WECHSLER, supra note 23, at 62-69.
32. A number of psychological studies provide evidence of tlie low self-esteem of
blacks. For example, Kennetll B. Clark found tllat black children preferred white dolls
and rejected black dolls when asked to choose which tliey would like to play witll,
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Third, many variables in the testing situation may contaminate
the score. These variables, unrelated to intelligence, depress the
measured performance of black and lower-class children. For example, in contrast to middle-class children, lower-class children will
tend to be less verbal, more fearful of strangers, less motivated
toward academic achievement, bilingual, less knowledgeable about
the world outside their neighborhood, and more likely to attend
inadequate schools.33 These factors may contribute to a reaction
knmvn as "test anxiety." 34 The disadvantaged child, apprehensive
about his ability to score well and fearful of what others may see in
the test score, may react to the testing situation in a self-defeating
manner: He may become highly nervous, or he may withdraw.35
Either reaction could lower his test score. The disadvantaged child
is likely to be under greater psychological stress than a middle-class
white child in a testing situation, and this stress is likely to affect test
performance. 36 Additionally, a black child may lack rapport with a
white examiner, a factor that could substantially affect his performance. 37
As a result of the above factors, there is a high degree of correlation between test scores on the standardized intelligence tests and
the socioeconomic and racial status of the child.38 The more disadwhich were bad, which were nice, and which were a nice color. Clark &: Clark, Racial
Identification and Preference in Negro Children in READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
551, 557 (2d ed. G. Swanson, T. Newcombe &: E. Hartley 1952). Results of the same
type have been obtained in a variety of settings. See Asher &: Allen, Racial Preference
and Social Comparison Processes, 25 J. SOCIAL ISSUES 157 (1969).
The implications of these findings for the testing situation are illustrated by a
study showing that the black testees demonstrated a greater lack of self-confidence on
personality tests than did the whites and that these personality variables correlated
more highly with intelligence test scores in blacks than in whites. See Roen, Personality and Negro-White Intelligence, 61 J. ABNORMAL &: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 148 (1960).
Additionally, evidence has revealed that black students do better on tests when they
expect to be compared to other blacks rather than to whites. See Katz, Roberts &:
Robinson, Effects of Task Difficulty, Race of Administrator, and Instructions on DigitSymbol Performance of Negroes, 2 J- PERSONALITY &: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 53 (1965).
33. See R. HURLEY, supra note 29, at 83-115.
34. Interview with Dr. William C. Rhodes, Professor of Psychology and Program
Director, Institute for the Study of Mental Retardation and Related Disabilities, University of Michigan, Feb. 4, 1973.
35. Id. "Withdrawal" in this situation means the failure to respond to either the
testing material or the tester.
36. See G. KIMBLE &: N. GARMEZY, supra note 20, at 558-60.
37. In a recent study blacks were tested by both black and white examiners. Under
nonthreatening conditions, in which the test was described as one involving eye-hand
coordination, blacks worked most efficiently when tested by a white adult. When the
black subjects, however, were told that the test was one of intellectual ability, performance was markedly lowered when the examiner was white, and it was slightly
elevated when the examiner was black. Katz, Review of Evidence Relating to Effects
of Desegregation on the Intellectual Performance of Negroes, 18 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
381 (1964).
38. Among the studies demonstrating that social class and race both operate as
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vantaged the child, the lower his test score will be. Race operates in
the same way. Usually the tests themselves are not constructed to
allow for these factors, and no appropriate adjustment of the test
scores is made.
The inadequacies of the intelligence tests harm the misplaced
minority child in several ways. One is by damaging the self-image of
the child. In psychological terms, to identify a child as retarded is to
relegate him to a mental prison, where the sentence of retardation
becomes a perpetual, self-fulfilling prophecy, limiting the child's
capabilities and opportunities. Studies indicate that once labeled and
committed to classes for the retarded a child will act out the stigmatized role of a mentally retarded person; he comes to see himself as
others see him. 39 A second harm resulting from misplacement is due
to the societal stigma attached to the label "mental retardate."40
Third, misplacement into EMR classes may deprive a child of a
factors in lowering over-all test scores are E. BAUGHMAN &: W. DAHLSTROM, NEGRO AND
WHITE CHILDREN (1968); M. DEUTSCH, THE DISADVANTAGED CHILD (1967); K. Er.Ls,
A. DAVIS, R. HAVIGHURSI', V. HERRICK &: R. TYLER, INTELLIGENCE AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES (1951); A. SHUEY, THE TE.STING OF NEGRO INTELLIGENCE (2d ed. 1966); Dreger &:
Miller, Comparative Psychological Studies of Negroes and Whites in the United States,
57 PSYCHOLOGICAL BuLL. 361 (1960); Jensen, How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic
Achievement?, 39 HARv. EDUCATIONAL REv. I (1969).
This evidence is interpreted in a variety of different ways, however. On the one
end of the spectrum is the idea that, since no type of intelligence test has ever been
able to eliminate these measured differences, there must indeed be innate differences in
intelligence between blacks and whites and between social classes. This is the view
subscribed to by Arthur Jensen, the noted Berkeley psychologist who has written the
most controversial article published to date on this proposition. See Jensen, supra. In
this article Jensen concluded that intelligence is attributable primarily to genetics (80
per cent) and only secondarily to other factors (20 per cent) and that blacks as a
group are genetically less endowed with intelligence than whites. Other writers supporting this view are H. EYSENCK, THE IQ ARGUMENT (1971) and Herrnstein, I.Q., ATLANTIC,
Sept. 1971, at 43.
A less harsh interpretation is made by what would probably be a majority of psychologists. This group generally assumes that intelligence tests, when used properly,
are relatively accurate indicators of the current level of intellectual functioning. Most
would probably say that racial differences in innate levels of intelligence have not
been demonstrated and probably do not exist. They would be somewhat more willing
to say that the differences in functioning level are due either entirely to environmental
difference or deprivation, or to a combination (in unspecifiable proportions) of environment interacting with innate intelligence. See generally E. BAUGHMAN &: W. DAHLSTROM, supra; Dreger &: Miller, supra.
Finally, on the other end of the spectrum are those who contend that all measured
differences in intelligence between social classes and racial groups are due to cultural
bias in the tests themselves and in the testing situation. See K. ELLS, A. DAVIS, R.
HAVIGHURST, V. HERRICK &: R. TYLER, supra; J. Mercer, supra note 28; Garcia, supra
note 28.
39. See Guskin &: Spicker, Educational Research in Mental Retardation, in 3 -RESEARCH IN MENTAL RETARDATION, 217, 250-51 (N. Ellis ed. 1968); Meyerowitz, Self-Derogations in Young Retardates and Special Class Placement, 33 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 443
(1962).
40. See S. Guskin, Social Psychologies of .Mental Deficiency, in HANDBOOK OF MENTAL DEFICIENCY 325 (N. Ellis ed. 1963); Clark, Children's Perception of a Special Class
for Educable .Mentally Retarded Children, 30 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 289 (1964).
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meaningful educational opportunity41 and its concomitant economic
and social remunerations.42 As previously discussed, the assumption
underlying EMR classes is that the students in them can learn only
up to a certain level. The student is deprived of the educational increment above that level. Additionally, in a curriculum for the mentally retarded improperly labeled children may not receive the
intensive, individualized remedial training needed to eradicate their
cultural and lingual deficiencies. It should be noted that even if a
student labeled retarded is left in the regular classroom, harm may
still occur from the labeling in that the teacher is often aware of his
label and treats him accordingly.43
41. Most of the studies on the efficacy of special classes for the mentally retarded
have found that mentally retarded children in regular classes are superior in academic
achievement to mentally retarded children in special classes. See, e.g., T. THURSTONE,
AN EVALUATION OF EDUCATING MENTALLY HANDICAPPED CHILDREN IN SPECIAL CLASSES
AND IN REGULAR GRADES (1959); Elenbogen, A Comparative Study of Some Aspects of
Academic and Social Adjustment of Two Groups of Mentally Retarded Children in
Special Classes and in Regular Grades, 17 DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS 2496 (1957). This
suggests that children who are misdiagnosed as mentally retarded and misplaced into
special classes will also regress educationally.
This finding has sometimes been attributed to the fact that those children who
remain in regular classes on waiting lists for special classes are less needy than those
immediately placed. H. GOLDSTEIN, J. Moss 8: L. JORDAN, THE EFFICACY OF SPECIAL CLASS
TRAINING ON DEVELOPMENT OF MENTALLY RETARDED CHILDREN 105-07 (1965). However,
with the proliferation of classes and the decline of waiting lists, this finding may have
less to do with differences in the children and more to do with differences in programs.
42. A number of studies have been directed at the occupational placement of
former students of special education classes. These studies reveal that the level of
unemployment among these subjects is greater than might be expected among workers
of unselected mentality, and that they tend to be clustered in the semiskilled and
unskilled employment categories. See Bobroff, Economic Adjustment of 121 Adults,
Formerly Students in Classes for Mental Retardates, 60 AM. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 525
(1956).
43. One team of researchers writes: "One of the most important sources of teach•
ers' expectations about their pupils' intellectual competence comes from standardized
tests of intelligence and achievement. Even when the administration of one of these
tests is more or less appropriate and valid, the results may influence the teacher's
prophecy about the child's subsequent intellectual performance." R. ROSENTHAL &:
L. JACOBSEN, PYGMALION IN THE CLASSROOM 55 (1968). These same authors, in a study
they call the Oak School Experiment, established teacher expectations for certain
randomly selected children. Teachers were told to expect these children to be academic
"spurters." When compared with a control group the experimental group showed
significantly greater IQ gains (on Flanagan's Tests of General Ability) and significantly
greater gains in report-card reading grades. Id. at 61-71.
The Rosenthal study has been subject to the criticism that it was concerned solely
with expectations of good performance. See "W'ikoff, Danger: Attacks on Testing Unfair, CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY NEWSLETTER, Fall 1970, at 3. Nevertheless, another
study dealing with the effect of teacher expectations upon the performance of borderline children has confirmed the "Rosenthal Effect." Teachers were assigned to tutor
a child in a specific task. Unknown to the teachers, the children had been randomly
divided into a "low" or "high" ability group; the assignments had no relation to
true ability. Teachers receiving a child from the "low" group got a "professional" profile that characterized the child as having a poor academic prognosis due to severe
cultural disadvantages. Profiles on "high" ability children provided a good prognosis
in spite of cultural disadvantages. After tutoring individual children in a simple sign•
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·with respect to deprivation of educational opportunity some
psychologists and educators argue that a class for the educable mentally retarded is merely another type of remedial class in which
certain children are placed because their present skills in reading,
abstract reasoning, and the like, are below the norm. 44 Likewise, they
argue that the term "intelligence" test is a misnomer for instruments
that in actuality are another form of "achievement" tests used to
separate a broad class of students who, for various reasons, do not
possess the same measure of skills as the great majority of the children tested. 45 But evidence to the contrary includes: (I) the fact that
so-called intelligence tests are used as the basis of placement, rather
than achievement tests; 46 (2) the existence of other classes, where
the label "mentally retarded" is not applied, for children whose
present level of functioning is below average; 47 (3) state administrative rules that regulate the weight to be given to intelligence tests
scores in the placement process and state laws that define the term
"educable mentally retarded" in such a way as to make clear that
EMR classes are based on estimates of potential intellectual capability;48 and (4) the fact that the estimated low potential learning
ability for those enrolled is the premise underlying the existence of
the EMR class.40

II.

THE LEGAL BACKGROUND

The relatively small number of cases in which courts have dealt
with the EMR placement of minority children may be attributed to
several factors. First, the parents of children who are placed into
EMR classes may generally defer to the professionals who make these
reading task, teachers estimated the child's intelligence. Significant differences were
found between the learning task scores of "high" and "low" groups; the scores paralleled the teachers' estimates of the participants' intelligence. The children's true IQs
bore no relationship either to learning scores or to estimates of intelligence. See
,v, HURDER, OVERVIEW OF REsEARCH AND EDUCATION OF HANDICAPPED CHILDREN: THE
U.S.A. IN THE SIXTIES 153-54 (1970). See generally Mazer, Effects of Social-Class Stereotyping on Teacher Expectations, 8 PSYCHOLOGY IN THE SCHOOLS 373 (1971); Palardy,
What Teachers Believe-What Children Achieve, 69 ELEMENTARY SCHOOL J. 370 (1969).
44. See, e.g., Wikoff, supra note 43, at 4.
45. See, e.g., Milgram, Danger: Chauvinism, Scapegoatism, and Euphemism, CLIN•
ICAL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY NEWSLETIER, Fall 1970, at 2.
46. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
47. See Garrison &: Hamill, Who Are the Retarded?, 38 Ex.CEPTIONAL CHILDREN 13
(1971).
48. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN, § 10-76a (Supp. 1973) defines an educable mentally
retarded child as "one who at maturity cannot be expected to attain a level of intellectual functioning greater than that commonly expected from a child of twelve years
of age but who can be expected to attain a level of intellectual functioning greater
than that of a seven year-old child." Thus, in Connecticut the de jure premise behind
classes for the educable mentally retarded is low estimated intellectual potential.
49. See notes 18-20 supra and accompanying text.
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decisions. Second, even when presented with a complaint by a
parent, an attorney may simply not have enough knowledge about
the structure of intelligence tests and the nature and efficacy of
classes for the educable mentally retarded, or the time to pursue the
interdisciplinary studies necessary to educate himself in order to
determine if his client has a valid claim. Moreover, to present such a
case effectively requires a large expenditure of funds, which is usually
beyond the financial resources of the parents of minority children
and may be prohibitive for an attorney otherwise willing to donate
his time.
Third, lawyers are usually aware that historically the courts have
adopted a hands-off approach toward the teacher-student relationship.50 They are also aware that courts have adhered to the conviction that educational placement based on the academic abilities of
children is a matter of administrative discretion best left to school
officials. 51 Courts, despite their activism in the school integration
struggle, or perhaps because of it, simply do not want to enthrone
themselves as "super boards of education," charged with overseeing
the complex, and often picayune, details of a school's internal operations.
Finally, an almost sacred validity is assigned by some educators
and by society as a whole to gadgetry and paraphernalia that promise
"scientific" results by "scientific" methods. Although there are educators who deal professionally with the various IQ tests on a regular
basis, many school systems permit poorly trained personnel to play
a substantial role in the labeling and placement of students as
mentally retarded. 52 Such personnel are inclined to treat test results
as miraculous "short-cuts" to an othenvise complicated diagnosis. As
a result, there has been little controversy in local educational communities over the procedures employed and, therefore, little litigation.
The first of the few decisions dealing with the use of standardized
tests and the educational placement of minority children was the
landmark case of Hobson v. Hansen. 53 Judge Skelly Wright found the
50. Schools have been looked upon as having plenary parental power over pupils
while they are in school. See, e.g., Richardson v. Braham, 125 Neb. 142, 249 N.W. 557
(1933); McLean Indep. School Dist. v. Andrews, 333 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960);
Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority To Regulate Student
Conduct and Status: A Nonconstitutional Analysis, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 373, 377-78
(1969).
51. See, e.g., Stell v. Board of Pub. Educ., 387 F.2d 486, 491 (5th Cir. 1967); Evans
v. Ennis, 281 F.2d 385, 395 (3d Cir.), application for stay denied, 364 U.S. 802 (1960);
Miller v. School Dist., 256 F. Supp. 370, 375 (D.S.C. 1966); Jones v. School Bd., 179
F. Supp. 280, 283 (E.D. Va. 1959), affd., 278 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1960).
52. See Ross, DeYoung & Cohen, Confrontation: Special Education Placement and
the Law, 378 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 5, 6 (1971).
53. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), affd. en bane sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408
F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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"tracking system" of educational placement in the Washington, D.C.,
public schools violative of the equal protection guarantee implicit
in the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 54 The "tracking
system" was a system of ability grouping in which students were
placed into "accelerated," "general," or "slow" classes on the basis
of their performance on standardized achievement tests and scholastic aptitude tests. The achievement tests, unlike the District of
Columbia aptitude tests or the IQ tests discussed throughout this
Comment, only purported to measure a student's present level of
skills in a given academic area; no inferences were made about his
over-all intellectual capacity. Yet, the court found that both types of
tests discriminate against black and lower-class children, for a disproportionate number of such children were assigned to lower tracks.
In reaching his decision, Judge Wright found that "[b]ecause these
aptitude and achievement tests are standardized primarily on and
are relevant to a white middle class group of students, they produce
inaccurate and misleading test scores when given to lower class and
Negro students." 55 The decision was affirmed on appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.56
Following Hobson, a number of articles dealing with the equal
protection aspects of the case appeared. 57 Several lawsuits relying on
Hobson were instituted around the nation. Many of these culminated in out-of-court settlements favorable to the plaintiffs; 58 others
54. 269 F. Supp. at 443, 511.
55. 269 F. Supp. at 514.
56. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en bane).
57. E.g., Note, Hobson v. Hansen: Judicial Supervision of the Color-Blind School
Board, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1511 (1968); Recent Development, Hobson v. Hansen: The
De Facto Limits on Judicial Power, 20 STAN. L. R.Ev. 1249 (1968); 32 ALBANY L. REV.
191 (1967); 53 IOWA L. R.Ev. 1184 (1968); 29 u. PITT. L. R.Ev. 749 (1967). See also Comrutnt, Ability Grouping in Public Schools: A Threat to Equal Protection?, I CONN.
L. R.Ev. 150 (1968); Note, The Legal Implications of Cultural Bias in the Intelligence
Testing of Disadvantaged School Children, 61 GEo. L.J. 1027 (1973).
58, Covarrubias v. San Diego Unified School DisL, Civil No. 70-394-S (S.D. Cal.,
Aug. 21, 1972), a class action on behalf of black and Mexican-American children,
alleged racial, cultural, and linguistic bias in IQ tests used for EMR placement. Both
injunctive and monetary relief were sought. The case was settled on Aug. 21, 1972,
on terms extremely favorable to plaintiffs; monetary relief, however, was limited to
nominal damages.
Guadalupe Organization, Inc. v. Tempe Elementary School Dist. No. 3, Civil No.
71-435-Phx (D. Ariz., Jan. 25, 1972), a class action filed on behalf of Mexican-Americans
and Yaqui Indians, alleged that EMR placement on the basis of tests given in English
to students more accustomed to other languages violated the fourteenth amendment.
This case was settled out of court with a stipulated agreement on January 25, 1972,
the terms of which were comparable to those set out in Diana v. State Bd. of
Educ., Civil No. C-70 37 RFP (N.D. Cal., Feb. 5, 1970, reopened Oct. 31, 1972).
Diana was a class action on behalf of all Mexican-American children and all
othen similarly situated who had been placed into EMR classes as a result of
their scores on the Stanford-Binet and Wechsler intelligence tests. These test were
written solely in English, while I.he children to whom I.hey were given spoke primarily
Spanish. After a retesting in their native language, many of the children no longer
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are not yet settled.59 The question of whether other courts would
follow Hobson remained speculative.
Recently, however, in P. v. Riles,60 a federal district court issued
a preliminary injunction against the placement of black students
into EMR classes primarily on the basis of the results of IQ tests if
such criteria resulted in a racial imbalance in those classes. The
court found that there was a disproportionate number of blacks in
the EMR classes,61 that the IQ tests utilized as the primary basis for
placement, among which was the Stanford-Binet,62 were biased
tested as retarded. The case was settled without a decision on the merits pursuant to
a stipulated agreement between the parties, which was adopted by the court as its
order on Feb. 5, 1970. The agreement included the following concessions to the plaintiffs: (1) All children whose primary home language is other than English must be
tested in both the primary language and in English. (2) Children must be tested
only with tests or sections of tests that do not depend on such things as vocabulary,
general information, or other similarly unfair verbal questions. (3) Mexican-American
and Chinese children already in classes for the mentally retarded must be retested
in their primary language and reevaluated only in terms of their achievement on
nonverbal tests or sections of tests. (4) Every school district must submit to the state
before the next school year a summary of retesting and reevaluation and a plan
listing special supplemental individual training that would be provided to help each
student return 1:o the regular school classes. (5) School psychologists must norm a new
or revised I.Q. test to reflect Mexican-American culture. This test would be normed
only on California Mexican-Americans, so that Mexican-American children tested
could be judged only on how they compared to the performance of their peers, not
to the performance of the population as a whole. (6) School districts that had a sufficient disparity between the percentage of Mexican-American students in regular classes
and classes for the retarded must submit an explanation. (7) Competent school psychologists should administer individual intelligence tests in the primary language or seek
out an interpreter who may be either a psychology trainee or intern or some other
employee of the school district. The case was recently re-opened to perfect the settle•
ment.
Since the time of the settlement, the California Education Code was revised to
reflect the above stipulations. See CAL. Enuc. CoDE §§ 6902.06-.095 (West Supp. 1973).
59. Stewart v. Philips, Civil No. 70-1199 F (D. Mass., filed Sept. 14, 1970), was a
class action on behalf of all black or poor Boston public school students who were
not mentally retarded but who were misplaced into EMR classes on the basis of their
scores on standardized intelligence tests, and on behalf of their parents, who were
denied an opportunity to participate in the placement decision. The complaint alleged
misclassification and misplacement due to the culture bias of the tests used. This case
has not yet come to trial, nor has it been settled in the interim.
Areola v. Board of Educ., Civil No. 160-577 (Orange County, Cal., Super. Ct., filed
June 7, 1968), also a class action filed on behalf of Mexican-American children, raised
the same issues as the Diana suit. Although the case has not yet been settled, it
appears to be moot in light of the recent changes in the California Education Code
described in note 58 supra.
See generally A CONTINUING SUMMARY OF PENDING AND COMPLETED LmGATION REGARDING THE EDUCATION OF HANDICAPPED CHILDREN (A. Abeson, Director, State-Federal
Information Clearinghouse for Exceptional Children, ed. Jan. 20, 1973).
60. 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972). See also Moses v. Washington Parish School
Bd., 330 F. Sup!)", 1340 (E.D. La. 1971), affd. per curiam, 456 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir.) cert,
denied, 409 U.S. 1013 (1972) (school district cannot assign students in recently deseg•
regated school to classrooms on basis of ability and achievement tests where the effect
of tests is to perpetuate segregation within the school).
61. 343 F. Supp. at UHL
62. The name of the test used by the school district was furnished by one of the
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against blacks,63 and, ultimately, that the use of the tests constituted
a denial of equal protection.64
These decisions centered on the equal protection aspect of EMR
placement. Although this aspect is important, the recent Supreme
Court decision in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez65 limits the application of the equal protection clause in the
education area. Although the following discussion will include the
equal protection aspect, the limitations imposed by Rodriguez make
the due process aspects of EMR placement more significant.
The Hobson decision, which dealt with the concept of tracking,
raises questions broader than EMR placement: Is tracking, even
when the IQ tests used to group children accurately reflect present
ability, constitutionally or socially unacceptable? 66 Are remedial (not
EMR) classes for minority children constitutionally mandated?67
This Comment will not discuss these larger issues, but will deal only
with the placement of minority children into EMR classes on the
basis of standardized IQ tests.

III.

LEGAL ARGUMENTS

A threshold issue is whether courts should involve themselves in
school board matters at all. 68 Recent cases still reflect the historical
reluctance of courts to act in the areas of school testing, curriculum,
and student placement.69 The courts are concerned that problems of
such educational complexity may not be suitable for judicial resolution. 70 It is clear, however, that where school administrative policy
affects important constitutional rights, the federal courts, including
attorneys of record. Telephone interview with Armondo M. Menocal III, San Francisco
Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation, March 14, 1973.
63. 343 F. Supp. at 1313.
64. 343 F. Supp. at 1314.
65. 41 U.S.L.W. 4407 (U.S., March 21, 1973).
66. Cf. Moses v. Washington Parish School Bel., 330 F. Supp. 1340 (E.D. La. 1971),
affd. per curiam, 456 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1013 (1972).
67. See United States v. Jefferson Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 891 (5th Cir. 1966),
affd. en bane, 380 F.2d 385, 394 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967); Montoya,
Bilingual-Bicultural Education: Making Equal Educational Opportunities Available
to National Origin Minority Students, 61 GEO. LJ. 991 (1973). But see Lau v. Nichols,
472 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1973).
68. See text accompanying notes 50-51 supra.
69. See, e.g., Stell v. Board of Pub. Educ., 387 F.2d 486, 491 (5th Cir. 1967) (pupil
assignment according to intelligence tests); Griggs v. Cook, 272 F. Supp. 163, 169
(N.D. Ga.), affd., 384 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1967) (curriculum); Youngblood v. Board of
Pub, Instruction, 230 F. Supp. 74, 76 (N.D. Fla. 1964) (pupil assignment according to
intelligence tests).
70. See Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional
Jurisprudence Undefined, 35 U. CHI. L REv. 583 (1968); Note, Hobson v. Hansen:
Judicial Supervision of the Color-Blind School Board, 81 HAB.v. L REv. 1511 (1968).
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the Supreme Court, will act despite the complexity of the educational
or administrative problem involved.71

A.

The Use of IQ Tests
I. Due Process

Although the state action required by the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment includes action taken by local governmental or quasi-governmental bodies such as school boards,72 at first
glance misplacement into an EMR class would not appear to deny
a child the "life, liberty, or property" protected by the due
process clause. The Supreme Court has, however, defined these terms
loosely and looked toward the importance of the specific individual
interest at stake with,out requiring that they be classifiable as either
"life," "liberty," or "property." Under this approach, the clause
applies whenever the state deals with an individual, so long as the
interests threatened are not wholly frivolous. 73
An individual's interest74 in an education has been held to be
important enough to warrant the protection of the due process
clause.76 Additionally, the labeling of a child as mentally retarded
may infringe upon his interest in freedom from "badges of infamy." 78
71. See, e.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438-40 (1968); Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Evans v. Ennis, 281 F.2d 385, 395 (3d Cir.), application for stay denied, !164 U.S. 802 (1960); United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of
Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 852-5!1 (5th Cir. 1966), afjd. en bane, 380 F.2d 385, cert. denied,
!189 U.S. 840 (1967); United States v. School Dist. 151, !101 F. Supp. 201, 228 (N.D.
Ill. 1969), modified, 432 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 94!1 (1971). CJ.
42 U.S.C. § 2000c(b) (1970). But cf. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 41
U.S.L.W. 4407 (U.S., March 21, 1973).
72. See Brown v. Board of Educ., !147 U.S. 48!1 (1954).
73. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972) (teacher employment); Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (replevin statutes); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 5!15 (1971)
(drivers' licenses); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 43!1 (1971) (stigma of being
labeled an excessive drinker); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (public assistance
benefits); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (wage garnishment).
74. The term "interest" seems accurate as there no longer appears to be any vitality
left in the right-privilege distinction. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571
(1972).
75. See, e.g., Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967); Dixon v. Alabama
State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, !168 U.S. 930 (1961); General
Order on Judicial Standard of Procedure and Substance in Review of Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 13!1 (W.D. Mo.
1968) (en bane). See also Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 397 U.S. 31, 35 (1970) (Douglas &:
Brennan, JJ ., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari).
76. In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970), the Supreme Court, in holding that
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required to establish guilt in juvenile delinquency
proceedings where the juvenile is charged with an act that would constitute a crime
if committed by an adult, stressed the stigma involved: "The requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt has this vital role in our criminal procedure for cogent
reasons. The_ accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interests of immense
importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction."
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A fundamental requirement of due process in some circumstances
is that any evidence used to determine whether adverse state action
should be taken against an individual must be reasonably related to
proving the appropriateness of the action. 77 In the present context,
the adverse action is the placement of children into classes for the
educable mentally retarded. The methods employed to determine
if this action should be taken are the standardized intelligence tests.
To the extent that these tests are untrustworthy indicators of mental
retardation in minority children, their use with respect to these
children may violate due process.
There are three lines of cases that support this contention. The
first relevant body of law deals with the constitutionality of certain
"identification" procedures. In Foster v. California,78 the use of
police "lineup" procedures, in which the defendant was exhibited
to witnesses for identification prior to trial, was challenged. The
Court concluded that, due to a number of factors in that case, it was
"all but inevitable" that the robbery victim would identify the
defendant as the robber, whether or not he was "in fact" guilty.79
In reversing the conviction, the Court reiterated a principle established in earlier cases: The conduct of identification procedures must
not be "so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable
mistaken identification" as to create a serious likelihood that an
innocent person could be convicted.80 Such procedures, according to
the Court's decisions, must be evaluated in light of the totality of
surrounding circumstances and require consideration of both the
necessity for the particular procedures used and the chance that they
might lead to an erroneous identification.81
The Supreme Court has recognized that even noncriminal stigmas attached to persons
as a result of governmental action may be sufficiently harmful to call the requirements
of due process into play. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1970) (stigma of
being labeled an excessive drinker held sufficient to invalidate a state statute allowing
public posting of names of persons deemed habitually guilty of excessive drinking
without giving affected persons notice or opportunity to protest inclusion of their
names on such a list); Cafeteria 8c Restaurant Workers, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 898 (1961); Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190-91 (1952) (origin of term "badge
of infamy'); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 140-41 (1951).
77. See, e.g., Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S.
463 (1943); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
78. 394 U.S. 440 (1969).
79. 394 U.S. at 443. The factors were (1) the defendant was placed in a lineup
with two other men who were considerably shorter than he; (2) he was the only one
who wore a jacket similar to the one the witness believed the robber had worn; (3)
when an initial lineup did not lead to positive identification, the police permitted a
one-to-one confrontation; and (4) when the witness remained uncertain, some days
later another lineup was arranged in which the defendant was the only person who
had also appeared at the first. 394 U.S. at 441-42.
80. 394 U.S. at 442.
81. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218 (1967).
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The second line of cases involves the use of coerced confessions.
Beginning with Brown v. Mississippi, 82 the Supreme Court has held
that the use of such confessions violates due process. 83 Three factors
underlie these decisions. The first is the desire to deter improper
police conduct. 84 The second is the fear that coerced confessions may
unduly influence the jury.85 The third is a belief that they lack an
assurance of reliability. 86
The third line of cases deals with constitutional limitations on
the creation and effect of certain presumptions. In Tot v. United
States 81 the Court stated the basic tests to be used in determining
the constitutionality of statutory presumptions in criminal laws. In
Tot, the defendants were convicted under a provision of the Federal
Firearms Act88 that made it "unlawful for any person convicted of
a crime of violence ... to receive any firearm ... which [had] been
shipped ... in interstate . . . commerce" and further provided that
"the possession of a firearm ... by any such person [is] presumptive
evidence that such firearm ... was ... received by such person in violation of [the] Act." 89 In holding that the presumption violated due
process, the Court stated that "a statutory presumption cannot be
sustained if there be no rational connection between the fact proved
and the ultimate fact presumed, if the jnference of the one from
proof of the other is arbitrary because of lack of connection between
the two in common experience." 90 The Co_urt noted that, although
state laws might make acquisition difficult, it did not follow from
proof of mere possession that the firearms must have been received
by the defendants in interstate, as opposed to intrastate, commerce
subsequent to the adoption of the federal statute.91
In a later case, Turner v. United States,92 the Court seems to have
gone beyond the requirement that the proved fact must tend to
prove the presumed fact rationally. It seems to have adopted the
standard that the presumed fact must actually exist beyond a reason82. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
83. Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62
(1949); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949).
84. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541, 544 (1961).
85. See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729 (1966); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S.
368, 389 (1964); Comment, Due Process Challenge to an Accomplice's Coerced Con•
fession, 58 GEO. L.J. 621, 627 (1970).
86. See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 182 (1957); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165, 173 (1952); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 605 (1944) (dictum). But see Roger&
v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1960).
87. 319 U.S. 463 (1943). See also United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965).
88. Ch. 850, § 2(f), 52 Stat. 1250 (1938).
89. 319 U.S. at 464.
90. 319 U.S. at 467-68.
91. 319 U.S. at 468.
92. 396 U.S. 398 (19'70).
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able doubt. 98 Although the decided cases to date have dealt only with
statutory presumptions, one noted authority is clearly of the opinion
that "theoretically due process problems may arise with regard to
any presumption [upon which the state relies] ...." 94
Undoubtedly, distinctions can be drawn between these three
lines of cases and the use of culturally and/ or racially biased IQ
tests in labeling a child mentally retarded and assigning him to a
mentally retarded class or track. The criminal lineup and confession
cases involve infringement of greater interests-freedom from physical incarceration and criminal stigma-than are at stake in the retardation cases. Labeling a child mentally retarded and relegating him
to a special class or track does not result in physical incarceration,
except to the extent that he is segregated physically from his mental
peers in a separate classroom. The Tot group of cases are also distinguishable from the EMR cases in that they too deal with criminal
proceedings, although the principle of the Tot group has once been
applied to a civil presumption.95
But the stigma attached to mental retardation, which equals or
exceeds in some cases the stigma of a criminal conviction (especially
a conviction for a trivial misdemeanor), the deprivation of a meaningful education and its concomitant rewards, and the irremedial
psychological damage done to a child by false labeling indicate that
interests of comparable weight are involved in EMR cases.
It should not matter, moreover, that due process traditionally has
required greater procedural safeguards in the criminal context.96 Recent Supreme Court decisions have looked past this antiquated criminal-civil dichotomy to the nature of the interests involved.97
At least under circumstances similar to those in Foster, Brown,
and Tot, it is clear that evidence that is the basis of adverse state action against an individual must be reasonably related to establishing
the appropriateness of the action. In the EMR context, if it can be
demonstrated that IQ scores are the sole or predominant criterion
utilized in the labeling process, that the decision maker is influenced
unduly by the scientific aura surrounding IQ tests, and that such
tests, as administered to poor and minority students, are culturally
biased, thus labeling some students as mentally retarded who are not
so in fact, it follows that the use of such tests as indicators of mental
93. See C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 344, at 816 (2d ed. 1972); Christie &: Pye, Presumptions and Assumptions in the Criminal Law: Another View, 1970 DUKE L.J. 919,
923·24.
94. C. McCoRMICK, supra note 93, § 344, at 811.
95. Western&: A. R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929). Doubt has been cast on
the vitality of this case, however, because of changes in the law of negligence. See
Fm. R. EVID. 301, Advisory Committee's Note.
96. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1967) (Black, J., concurring).
97. See, e.g., cases cited in note 73 supra.
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retardation is not reasonably related to the proper placement of minority children. What is unclear, however, is the willingness of courts
to extend the Foster-Brown-Tot principle beyond its present criminal context to EMR placement.

2. Equal Protection
Under the traditional equal protection standard, a state generally
retains discretion to classify people so long as the classification bears
a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.98 The state is
not required to classify people with "mathematical precision," 99 and
classifications made by the state bear a presumption of validity. 100
However, if the classification infringes upon fundamental rights101
or is "suspect," 102 it must be tailored precisely to accomplish its purpose,103 less drastic means must not be available to accomplish its objective,104 and, ultimately, the interests furthered must be justified
by a compelling interest.105
The first step in applying the traditional test is to identify the
classification involved. The criterion purportedly used by school authorities to classify students is learning ability as measured by standardized intelligence tests. Ostensibly, this criterion separates students into only two broad classes: (1) a class of students who possess
the skills measured by these tests and therefore remain in regular
classes where they can perform to the best of their abilities; and (2)
a class of students who do not and cannot possess the skills measured
by these tests, who are in reality educably mentally retarded, and
who are placed in special classes where they, like the regular students,
can perform at their maximum level. However, the criterion, as applied, appears to create in addition a third broad class of students
who are black, Indian, chicano, and/ or poor, who, although not
presently possessing the skills measured by the tests, are capable of
acquiring them but are nonetheless placed in special classes that are
not conducive to educating them to perform to the full extent of
their capabilities.
Once the affected classes have been identified, under the tradi98. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,425 (1961).
99. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
100. See, e.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-80 (1911).
101. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of personal privacy); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote in state elections); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Wil•
liamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate).
102. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (race); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1947) (ancestry).
103. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 351, 357-58 (1972).
104. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972).
105. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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tional equal protection test the question then becomes whether the
discrimination among the classes is "reasonable." Specifically, the issue is whether placement through the use of standardized intelligence tests is reasonably related to a proper governmental objective.
It could be argued that the use of IQ tests bears no rational relationship to the placement of minority children because of the defects in
the tests. This irrationality is twofold: The children are not properly
tested for placement into regular classes, and they are not properly
tested for placement into LD rather than EMR classes. If the school
in question has only one class for abnormal children, it could be
argued that a refusal to draw a distinction between the LD and EMR
classes where the circumstances manifestly justify the distinction violates the equal protection clause. 106
However, a system of ability grouping is rationally related to one
legitimate state objective-educating those most capable of learning
-in that the "normal" children are separated from those students
who, for whatever reason, are unable to maintain the pace of the
normal curriculum. That the instruments, that is, intelligence tests,
used to make this division do not further subdivide those students
who are unable to compete in the normal curriculum into the truly
mentally retarded and the socio-culturally deprived does not detract
from the fact that the division accomplished is related to a legitimate
governmental objective. Thus, it would appear that an attack on the
placement of minority children into EMR classes under the traditional equal protection test would be unsuccessful, for under that
test one reasonable basis for a discriminatory classification is sufficient, regardless of other injurious consequences.107
There is a possible variation of the traditional test that should
be discussed. Recent court decisions striking down state requirements while voicing the traditional test have cast doubt on the permissiveness of the traditional standard. 108 Minimal rationality of
means may no longer be sufficient to justify a classification,109 and a
106. An analogous principle has been relied on by courts in at least two recent
cases to strike down criminal statutes grouping marijuana with "hard drugs" for purposes of the imposition of penalties. People v. McCabe, 49 Ill. 2d 338, 275 N.E.2d 407
(1971); People v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91, 194 N.W.2d 878 (1972). See also Wyatt v.
Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
107. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
108. State classifications are overturned under this standard only when "no grounds
can be conceived to justify them." McDonald v. Board of Election Commrs., 394 U.S.
802, 809 (1969).
109. See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S.
504 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971);
Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973) (Mansfield, J.); Green v.
Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973) (Feinberg, J.). See generally Gunther,
Foreword: In Search of E,,olving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). For recent Supreme Court opinions that
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court may no longer accept just any legitimate purpose. 110 However,
in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguezm the Supreme Court,
upholding the Texas property tax system of financing public education, refused to adopt this approach and thus cast doubt upon the
applicability of these recent decisions to the area of education.112
There is a second variation of the traditional standard that may
apply. The district court in P. v. Riles113 explicitly stated that it was
rejecting that part of the traditional equal protection test that places
the burden on the plaintiff to prove that no rational relationship exists between the method of classification used and the outcome of
the classification.114 The court accepted in its place the plaintiff's
theory that once a racial imbalance in EMR classes is demonstrated
the burden of proof shifts to the defendant school authorities to demonstrate the rationality of the mode of classification. The court cited
cases holding that if a job qualification test excludes a greatly disproportionate number of blacks, the burden shifts to the employer
to demonstrate that the test is valid for purposes of selecting employees ;115 that when qualification tests for jury service lead to disproportionately low numbers of blacks on juries, the burden shifts
to the state to explain why passing such a test indicates that one will
be an effective juror; 116 and that when a school district's methods for
delineating school boundaries result in student bodies of predominately one race or another, the burden shifts to the school district to
demonstrate that its methods serve valid and educationally relevant
purposes. 117 As a rationale for its rejection of the more traditional
approach to burden of proof, the Riles court stated:
Insofar as the cases which have shifted the burden of proof rely
for their support on this general distrust of classifications which
harm blacks as an identifiable group, then this Court feels compelled
to shift the burden in the instant case if plaintiffs can demonstrate
suggest a balancing approach, see Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Weber v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
110. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 451 (1972). See also Rosario v.
Rockefeller, 41 U.S.L.W. 4401, 4404 (U.S., March 21, 1973) (dictum).
111. 41 U.S.L.W. 4407 (U.S., March 21, 1973).
112. 41 U.S.L.W. at 4424. Justices Marshall, 41 U.S.L.W. at 4437, 4445, and White,
41 U.S.L.W. at 4427, however, in their dissents disagreed with the Court's rigid
approach to equal protection.
113. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
114. 343 F. Supp. at 1308-09.
115. 343 F. Supp. at 1309, citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971);
Western Addition Community Organization v. Alioto, 340 F. Supp. 1351 (N.D. Cal.
1972).
116. 343 F. Supp. at 1309, citing Carmical v. Craven, 457 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1971)
(Hufstedler, J.).
117. 343 F. Supp. at 1309, citing United States v. School Dist. 151, 286 F. Supp. 786
(N.D. Ill.), affd., 404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 943 (1971).
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that I.Q. tests are in fact the primary basis for placing students in
EMR classes and that in fact there is a disproportionately high number of black students in the EMR classes.118
The court found that the evidence introduced by plaintiffs established the above mentioned facts; it then shifted to the school authorities the burden of proof, which they failed to meet.
One difficulty with the Riles case lies in the court's failure to consider fully one of three elements of the case that had to be present to
establish an equal protection violation under the traditional test.
The three elements were (I) that there was a causal relation between the use of the tests and the racial imbalances in the EMR
classes; (2) that the tests were not rationally related to the state purpose for which they were being used, that is, determining the intellectual capacity of black and poor children; and (3) that the use of
the tests for black and poor children was not rationally related to
any other legitimate educational purpose. The court failed to consider fully the third element; the administration of the biased IQ
tests may have been related to one legitimate educational purposespecifically, separation of "fast" learners from "slow" learners. 119
Furthermore, it is questionable whether the Riles court should
have shifted the burden of proof at all. In Jefferson v. Hackney, 120
blacks and Mexican-Americans brought an action challenging Texas'
administration of its welfare program. Persons receiving welfare under the category of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
received less than persons receiving aid under other categories, such
as aid to the aged and aid to the totally disabled. The AFDC program
was funded at seventy-five per cent of recognized need, while the
other programs were funded at ninety-five per cent and one hundred
per cent of recognized need, and there was a larger percentage of
118. 343 F. Supp. at 1309. The courts in the jury selection cases did not have to
consider other legitimate governmental objectives that might have been served by the
qualification tests given to prospective jurors, since there could be no other legitimate
objective than the selection of competent jurors. This was also true in the employment
cases. Either an employment test was related to determining if a person would perform
a particular job competently, or it was not. Nor was there a need to reach the problem
of other valid government purposes in the desegregation case relied on by the Riles
court, because in that case-United States v. School Dist. 151, 286 F. Supp. 786 (N.D.
Ill.), affd., 404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968), ce1·t. denied, 402 U.S. 943 (1971)-there had
been prior intentional racial discrimination in the school district, and the court found
that present pupil assignment practices were being intentionally utilized to maintain
that discrimination.
119. The court did consider the possibility that the IQ tests segregated students
according to their ability to learn in regular classes; however, it limited its consideration
to the effects on black children, 343 F. Supp. at 1313-14. It failed to consider
the possibility that the tests might have separated those students best capable of learning from those unable to maintain the pace of the normal curriculum regardless of
whether the latter were black or white. Under tl1e traditional test if this purpose were
met the classification would be upheld. See text accompanying notes 106-07 supra.
120. ·106 U.S. 535 (1972).
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blacks and Mexican-Americans in AFDC (eighty-seven per cent) than
in the other programs, where whites were sixty per cent and fiftythree per cent of the recipients. 121 Despite the fact that blacks and
Mexican-Americans overwhelmingly populated the program receiving the least aid, the Supreme Court applied the traditional equal
protection test, refused to shift the burden of proof to the state, and
upheld the practice.
There are also problems with respect to the more stringent, compelling interest version of the equal protection test. In Hobson v.
Hansen, 122 which held that the "tracking system" used in District of
Columbia schools violated the equal protection clause, the court indicated that both suspect classifications and a fundamental right were
involved. 123 Since the tests employed were standardized largely on
white and middle-class persons124 and since they contained language
forms and vocabularies alien to black and poor students, the court
concluded that the students were being classified on suspect racial
and economic grounds, rather than on ability to learn. 125 Likewise,
the court seemed to assume, without lengthy explanation, that equal
educational opportunity was a fundamental right.
San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez126 has ended the long
debate over the proper equal protection characterization of the interest in education. The Court explicitly found that education was
not a fundamental right. 127 Therefore, if the compelling interest test
is to be applied, as it was in Hobson, it must be because a suspect
classification is involved.
A suspect classification is one the Supreme Court has labeled
"suspect" and has subjected to the stringent compelling interest
standard.128 These classifications have been defined by the Court as
referring to "discrete and insular" minorities. 129 To date, only race,1 30
ancestry,131 and alienage132 have been found to be "discrete and insular."
121. 406 U.S. at 548.
122. See text accompanying notes 53-56 supra.
123. The reasoning of the opinion is criticized in Comment, supra note 57.
124. Significantly, in the test used in the District of Columbia placement process
possibly only 60 per cent of the standardized group were white and middle-class. 269
F. Supp. at 479.
125. 269 F. Supp. at 514.
126. 41 U.S.L.W. 4407 (U.S., Marcli 21, 1973).
127. 41 U.S.L.W. at 4418. The argument that education is a fundamental right
may still be viable under state constitutions, however. See Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.
2d 584, 597 n.11, 487 P.2d 1241, 1249 n.11, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 609 n.11 (1972) (state
constitutional provision as alternative ground).
128. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 338 U.S. 1, 9, 11 (1967).
129. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 204 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
130. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
131. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
132. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
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The courts may find classification on the basis of IQ tests suspect
because of the possibility that students are grouped, not according
to their ability to learn, but according to their racial, social and economic status. While all students are given the same tests, a seemingly
fair procedure, these tests are standardized only as to white, middleclass students and heavily emphasize verbal skills. Thus, the results
may be valid indicators of mental retardation only for white, middleclass students. 133
The difficulty with this argument is that the standardized tests do
not on their face set apart blacks and the poor for discriminatory
treatment. The disproportionate effect on blacks, other minorities,
and the poor is, arguably, merely a by-product of a legitimate system
of ability grouping. That a governmental program has different impacts on different races or economic groups does not necessarily make
it constitutionally "suspect." For example, assume that approximately thirty per cent-or any other percentage larger than that of
blacks in the U.S.-of the persons arrested nationwide for armed
robbery are black. This would not make the armed robbery statutes
"suspect." More directly on point is the school segregation that results from segregated neighborhoods, a by-product of the effort to
provide neighborhood schools. Although the Court may soon find
these de facto school segregation schemes unconstitutional, the issue
is presently an open one. 134 In any case, EMR placement appears to
be different from either of these two examples. Although both the
armed robbery statute and the requirement that children attend
neighborhood schools result in disproportionate numbers of blacks
and poor being adversely affected, this result does not stem from any
intrinsic defect in the statute or rule applied. IQ tests, however, are
intrinsically defective in that they are normed to white children but
used to measure the abilities of nonwhites. In this sense EMR placement seems more akin to de jure segregation, such as that resulting
from purposeful exclusion of blacks by gerrymandering school districts, than to de facto segregation. Both gerrymandered school dis133. See notes 1-49 supra and accompanying text.
134. Although the Supreme Court has prohibited educational discrimination under
color of law, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), it has never directly
addressed itself to the problem of de facto segregation. In one recent case an equally
divided (4•4) Court, without opinion, affirmed a court of appeals decision allowing
racially segregated schools that resulted from racially segregated neighborhoods. Bradley
v. Virginia State Bd. of Educ., 41 U.S.L.W. 4685 (U.S., May 21, 1973), affirming 462 F.2d
1058 (4t11 Cir. 1972). The Court had previously declined to rule on similar schemes.
E.g., United States v. School Dist. 151, 402 U.S. 943 (1971), denying cert. to 432 F.2d
1147 (7th Cir. 1970); Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 389 U.S. 847 (1967), denying cert.
to 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966); Downs v. Board of Educ., 380 U.S. 914 (1965), denying
cert. to 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964); Taylor v. Board of Educ., 368 U.S. 940 (1961).
In its most recent decision on this subject, Keyes v. School Dist. No. I, 41 U.S.L.W.
5002 (U.S., June 21, 1973), the Supreme Court held that the mere assertion of a
"neighborhood school policy" is insufficient if there is evidence that the school authorities "have practiced de jure segregation in a meaningful portion of the school system
...." 41 U.S.L.W. at 5008.
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tricts and EMR placement by the use of IQ tests are specifically designed in ways that affect blacks adversely-that is, discrimination is,
by definition, a necessary result of the process. Gerrymandered districts have been held to be defined improperly; 135 it can be argued
that the EMR groups have similarly been defined improperly.
A court may also be disposed to consider the classification here
in question suspect because it involves a group of defenseless victims
-both poor and young-traditionally favored by the courts. 136 However, the Court in Rodriguez dealt with a classification that adversely
affected a similar group and did not find it suspect. 137
A third possibility is that the class "mentally retarded" may be
suspect. Support for this approach can be found in recent decisions
in which the Supreme Court has held that classifications dealing
with aliens are suspect138 and in which it has looked closely at the
classification "illegitimate children." 139 (In the latter case, however,
it is not clear whether a compelling interest analysis or a balancing of
interests was used. 140) The common characteristics of both these classifications seem to be group stigmatization, a history of discrimination, political impotence, and ready identifiability. These characteristics would appear also to apply to the mentally retarded. However,
the present Court appears to be reluctant to expand the parameters
of equal protection to include new suspect classifications.141
If a suspect classification does exist and, therefore, the compelling
interest standard is used, school boards would fare poorly. Classification based primarily on IQ tests lacks the surgical precision required
by the compelling interest standard. 142 Additionally, it is extremely
135. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (gerrymandered voting
districts declared unconstitutional because of racially discriminatory effect).
136. For example, the poor have received favorable judicial treatment in the area
of criminal law and procedure. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Smith v.
Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956). For examples of Supreme Court solicitude toward children, see Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (limitations upon distribution of literature to minors
more restrictive than rules applied to adults in obscenity cases upheld); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (application to Jehovah's Witnesses of state statute
providing that no boy under twelve or girl under eighteen can sell periodicals on the
street held constitutional-immunity from regulation of religious activities subordinated
to interest of state in protecting children).
137. 41 U.S.L.W. at 4412-15.
138. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). See also Takahashi v. Fish 8:
Game Commn., 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
139. Weber v. Aetna Cas. 8: Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1971); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S.
535 (1973). See also Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona v. American Guar. 8:
Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968). But see Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
140. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. 8: Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1971); Gomez v.
Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973).
141. E.g., San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 41 U.S.L.W. 4407 (U.S., March 21,
1973). See Gunther, supra note 109, at 12-16.
142. See text accompanying note 103 supra.
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doubtful whether any of the educational goals for IQ testing espoused by school authorities are compelling; few state goals have
ever met this requirement. 143

B. Procedural Protection for Families of Children
Placed into EMR Classes
If, despite the arguments raised above, the use of present-day IQ
tests is allowed in the labeling-placement decision, students and parents may nevertheless be entitled to some protection against improper placement procedures under the due process clause. The most
common procedural due process requirement is that the individual
be given adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard before adverse governmental action is taken against him.14-1 In some situations,
such as criminal trials, due process requires more: the opportunity to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses,145 the right to be represented by counsel (including assigned counsel if the individual is
too poor to hire an attorney),146 and the right against self-incrimination.147 But not all of these procedural safeguards are constitutionally
required in all proceedings; 148 until relatively recently, most of them
were available only in criminal proceedings.140 In addition to this
criminal-civil dichotomy, the courts had also recognized a judicialadministrative (or judicial-legislative) dichotomy, rather inflexibly
refusing to sanction procedural safeguards in those proceedings labeled "civil," "administrative," or "legislative." 150
Today these mechanical distinctions have eroded, and the Su143. For the few interests that have been found to be compelling, see Marston v.
Lewis, 41 U.S.L.W. 3498 (U.S., March 19, 1973) (integrity of voting process); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (life of mother and fetus); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944) (national security in time of war). See also Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182,
185-87 (1970).
144. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of public assistance
benefits); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (prejudgment garnishment);
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965) (taking custody of child from one parent and
awarding it to other); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956) (dismissal from employment); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (contempt of court).
145. E.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
146. E.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
147. E.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
148. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (no right to trial by
jury in juvenile delinquency proceedings); Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778
(2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968) (no right to have attorney present at
conference that could result in placement in a school for the maladjusted or in permanent suspension from school).
149, For an explanation of the historical and functional considerations that in the
past severely limited the application of due process standards to noncriminal areas,
sec Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law,
81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
150. See, e.g., Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 152 (1941);
Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908). See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE
§ 7.03 (Supp. 1970).
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preme Court has made it clear that where sufficiently important interests are at stake or where the threatened adverse action is particularly harsh, certain due process safeguards must be applied. 151 In
general, what satisfies the requirements of due process in any given
circumstance turns upon the nature of the proceedings involved and
the interests, both governmental and private, affected by these proceedings. As the Supreme Court succinctly stated in Hannah v.
Larche: 152
"Due process" is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and its content varies according to specific factual contexts.
. . . Whether the Constitution requires that a particular right obtain
in a specific proceeding depends upon a complexity of factors. The
nature of the alleged right involved, the nature of the proceeding,
and the possible burden on that proceeding, are all considerations
which must be taken into account.
Traditionally, fewer procedural safeguards have been required
where children are involved because the state, out of its solicitude
for the welfare of minors, did not want to subject them to the harsher
adult processes. This argument, based on the time-worn concept of
parens patriae,153 is now outmoded. In the landmark decision of In
re Gault,1 54 the Supreme Court held that, in juvenile proceedings
that may result in commitment to an institution, the child or his
parents must be (1) given notice sufficient to permit preparation of
a defense to the charges; (2) given notice of the child's right to be
represented by counsel (including assigned counsel if the parents
cannot afford to pay); and (3) afforded the right against self-incrimination and the rights of confrontation and cross-examination. The
Court broke with tradition in extending these procedural rights,
traditionally applied only in the criminal law area, to an area that
had been previously classified as civil,155 thus discounting the criminal-civil and adult-child dichotomies.156 Of paramount concern to
151. See notes 156-59 infra and accompanying text.
152. 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
153. The doctrine of parens patriae, the cornerstone of the juvenile justice system
of every state, is that the state, as a substitute parent, will act in the best interests
of the child and will competently control and rear the child. See, e.g., Pee v. United
States, 274 F.2d 56 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary
System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 7, 10.
As one set of authorities has noted, "Because the state is supposed to proceed .•.
as parens patriae and not as an adversary, courts have relied on the premise that the
proceedings are 'civil' in nature and not criminal, and have asserted that the child
cannot complain of the deprivation of important rights available in criminal cases."
0. KETCHAM & M. PAULSEN, CASES AND MATERIALS !U:LATING TO JUVENILE COURTS 257
(1967).
154. 387 U.S. I (1967).
155. See 387 U.S. at 59-60 (Black, J., concurring).
156. 387 U.S. at 16-27.
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the Court were the practical consequences stemming from the adjudication of a minor as a juvenile delinquent, that is the possibility
of incarceration for a period of years far in excess of the adult penalty for the equivalent crime and the resultant stigmatization.
Similarly, in Heryford v. Parker,151 a habeas corpus action
brought by a mother on behalf of her mentally deficient son who
had been committed to a state training school for the feebleminded
and epileptic, the plaintiff, relying on Gault, alleged that the child
had been denied his constitutional right to counsel and confrontation at his commitment hearing. Attempting to distinguish Gault,
the state argued that Gault was concerned with commitment for correction or rehabilitation of juveniles, while the present proceeding
was concerned solely with commitment for teaching and training the
mentally deficient. 158 Dismissing the state's argument, the court of
appeals stated, "The overriding consideration of the [Gault] court
was that in either case the determination carried with it the 'awesome
prospect of incarceration in a state institution.' " 159 "\.Yhile rejecting
the civil-criminal dichotomy and emphasizing the incarcerative consequences of juvenile adjudications, the Heryford court also greatly
reduced the use of the concept of parens patriae as an excuse for
denying procedural rights.160
These cases, which were greatly concerned with the stigmatization attendant upon incarceration, indicate that a court may also
view it as unreasonable to stigmatize children as mentally retarded
without proper procedural safeguards. It is true that the juvenile
delinquency cases involved physical incarceration, but it can be argued that there is an equivalent harm when a child is labeled mentally retarded in that he is involuntarily segregated, confined in a
separate classroom, and locked into an inferior educational "track.''
Additionally, there is a figurative (but no less damaging) imprisonment of the child for the rest of his life within the world of the mentally retarded.
The interests accorded due process protection in recent nonincarceration cases do not appear to be more important than those
157.
158.
159.
160.

396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968).
396 F.2d at 395.
396 F.2d at 395.

It matters not whether the proceedings be labeled "civil" or "criminal" or
whetl1er tlie subject matter be mental instability or juvenile delinquency. It is the
likelihood of involuntary incarceration-whether for punishment as an adult for
a crime, rehabilitation as a juvenile for delinquency, or treatment and training
as a feeble-minded or mental incompetent-which commands observance of the
constitutional safeguards of due process. Where, as in botli proceedings for juveniles and mentally deficient persons, tlie state undertakes to act in parens patriae,
it has tlie inescapable duty to vouchsafe due process, and tliis necessarily includes
the duty to see tliat a subject of an involuntary commitment proceedings [sic]
is afforded the opportunity to the guiding hand of legal counsel at every step
of tlie proceedings • . . •
396 F.2d at 396.

1240

111.ichigan Law Review

[Vol. 71:1212

threatened by the retardation labeling-placement process. For example, in Bell v. Burson,161 the Court found as violative of due process a Georgia statute that required the suspension of a driver's license without a hearing where a driver who had been involved in an
accident failed to post security for damages claimed by the injured
party. And in Wisconsin v. Constantineau.,162 the Court upheld a
challenge on due process grounds to a statute that authorized the
public posting of the names of persons believed guilty of excessive
drinking in order to prevent them from obtaining liquor. Since the
statute made no provision for notice or hearing before posting, none
was given. The Court held that the characterization of a person as
an excessive drinker, though a mark of serious illness to some, is such
a stigma or badge of disgrace to others that procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard.163 Although there is
no formula by which the interests infringed in each of these cases
can be quantified and mathematically measured against the interests
in the present situation, it seems that the interests involved in the
mental retardation labeling process-the interest in equal educational opportunity, the interest in being free from arbitrary racial
and economic discrimination, and the interest in freedom from undeserved stigmatization-are sufficient to bring them within the recently expanded parameters of due process exemplified by these cases.
In cases dealing specifically with education, lower courts have
held that a state college or university student suspended for a substantial period has a right to a hearing,164 to be advised at the hearing by counsel,10:, to examine adverse statements on which the charges
against him are based,166 and to be provided with an oral or written
report on the facts to which each witness testifies. 167 In the area of
secondary education, lower courts have found that due process re161. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
162. 400 U.S. 435 (1971). For other cases extending the due process hearing require•
ments to noncriminal areas, see Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (state replevin
provisions); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of public assistance benefits); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (prejudgment garnishment);
Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (denial of license to
practice law); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953) (alien deportation);
Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (right to contract with the govern•
ment); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964) (denial of retail liquor license).
163. 400 U.S. at 437. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (teacher's em•
ployment contract). Cf. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
164. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 930 (1961).
165. Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 648 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
166. See Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 648, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
167. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158-59 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961). There need be no stenographic or mechanical recording
of the proceedings, however. Due v. Florida A. & M. Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396, 402-03
(N.D. Fla. 1963).
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quires a hearing before a student can be expelled for any significant
period; 168 more specific requirements have not yet been spelled out.169
An important common feature of the cases discussed above is that
the hearings were deemed necessary in order to consider facts unique
to the individual rather than facts determining general policy decisions. The courts found that the first category of facts should not be
determined without giving adversely affected individuals an opportunity to know and confront unfavorable evidence.170 Although the
decision to use IQ tests may be a general policy matter, individual
placement clearly involves facts unique to the individual that can
most appropriately be determined at a hearing.
There are interests that militate against requiring any hearings or
full adversarial hearings in this setting. As previously discussed, the
burden on the government must be balanced against the private interest affected by governmental action.171 One obvious cost to the government is monetary expense. Moreover, there may be a diversion of
a school's nonmonetary resources and energies to the hearing process.
However, these costs have not been considered prohibitive in establishing hearing requirements for other educational decisions involving a small number of individuals with important personal interests.
For example, schools have been required to hold hearings when discharging some teachers172 and when expelling students.173 Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that where the interest in reducing
expenses is the principle justification for a denial of due process, that
interest is not dispositive.174
There are other important government interests involved in
EMR placement. First, a formal hearing might destroy informal relationships and set against one another people who are not truly adversaries; in the EMR context, informal counseling, between school
diagnosticians and educators on the one hand and the parents on the
other, constitutes an important aspect of the placement process. Implicit in this argument is the assumption that in most cases the diagnostician is making a proper determination that the child is retarded
and is advising the parents on that basis. This may not be true with
respect to minority group children. Since they populate the ranks of
168. Hobson v. Bailey, 309 F. Supp. 1393 (W.D. Tenn. 1970); See Jackson v. Domer,
424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1970); Abbott, Due Process and Secondary School Dismissals, 20
CASE W. R.Es. L. REv. 378, 393-94 (1969); Comment, Procedural Due Process in Secondary
Schools, 54 MARQ. L. REv. 358, 359 (1971).
169. See Comment, supra note 168, at 362-68.
170. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISI"RATIVE LAW TEXT§ 7.03 (3d ed. 1972).
171. See text accompanying note 152 supra.
172. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972) (dictum).
173. See, e.g., Hobson v. Bailey, 309 F. Supp. 1393 (W.D. Tenn. 1970).
174. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540-41 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
261 (1970), quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 889-900 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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the nation's EMR classes out of proportion to their number in the
population as a whole,175 it may be fair to infer that diagnosticians
have been wrong in a substantial number of cases involving minority
children.176 Hearings may strengthen the fact-finding process by encouraging clinicians to make a more considered initial diagnosis and
to place less reliance on tests and techniques that have not been validated with respect to minority group children.
A second concern is that the availability of formal proceedings
might discourage special education personnel from making any but
the most obvious placement decisions for fear of a professionally embarrassing reversal at a hearing. This risk seems far less serious than
the harm that could be caused by misplacement.
A third concern is that the hearing process may cause an atrophy
of internal educational initiative in vital areas. If left to their own
devices, it has been argued, special education administrators, who
best know both the needs of the children and the resources of the
system, would eventually do a better job than the courts. In Goldberg v. Kelly,117 the dissenters raised a similar argument that the
Court should not act because the administrative agency involved was
about to issue a ruling that would adequately meet the needs of all
parties.178 But, as one commentator has pointed out, the agency
dragged its feet on promulgation of the rule for several months and
did not seem committed to the remedial procedures. 170 Special educators also have moved slowly in changing placement practices even
after the legal problems have been made clear. For example, an EMR
placement suit recently reopened in California alleges that a school
district is not following court-ordered EMR hearing procedures.180 In
another example, special educators in Arizona continued to administer IQ tests written solely in English to Guadalupe Indian children,
who spoke little or no English, months after a case challenging similar
practices toward Mexican-American children was first instituted in
California,181 despite the wide publicity that the case received in
175. See notes 1-5 supra and accompanying text.
176. There is other support for this conclusion. A study of 378 eleven-year-old
children in EMR classes in the Philadelphia area, which used multiple criteria in the
evaluative process, indicated that 25 per cent were misplaced. Garrison & Hammill,
supra note 47, at 19.
177. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
178. 397 U.S. at 282-83. The proposed HEW regulation was, in fact, more generous
than the Court's mandate in certain respects. It assured that welfare payments would
continue until a statutory fair hearing took place, and the regulation's hearing included certain safeguards not demanded by the Court.
179. Christensen, Of Prior Hearings and Welfare as "New Property," 3 CLEARING·
HOUSE REV. 321, 336 (1970).
180. Joint Response of Plaintiffs and Defendants to Notice of Call of the General
List and Order, Oct. 31, 1972, Diana v. State Bd. of Educ., Civil No. C-70 37 RFP
(N.D. Cal., Feb. 5, 1970, reopened Oct. 31, 1972).
181. Diana v. State Bd. of Educ., Civil No. C-70 37 RFP (N.D. Cal., Feb. 5, 1970,
reopened Oct. 31, 1972). See note 58 supra.
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educational literature and despite the obvious unfairness of the testing procedure. Only after court review was sought in Arizona did the
practice finally end.182 Thus, recent experience belies any optimism
that the self-improving impulses of the administrative process will
create procedural safeguards in the area of special education without
court review.
Because the students' interests seem to outweigh the disadvantages to the school system of holding a hearing, it seems probable
that procedural protections will be required for minority children
facing placement into EMR classes. To say that the due process
clause is applicable, however, does not necessarily mean that a full
trial-type hearing is constitutionally required. The Supreme Court
generally requires that the affected individual be provided, at the
minimum, with a "meaningful" opportunity to have the crucial issue heard. In judging the adequacy of procedures, the courts consider "[t]he precise nature of the interest that has been adversely affected, the manner in which this was done, the reasons for doing it,
the available alternatives to the procedure that was followed, ... and
the balance of hurt complained of and good accomplished ...." 183
The essential and unanswered question is how much "process" is
"due"-when and how elaborate must the hearing be.
With regard to the question of timing, there seems to be almost
a general presumption that one who is constitutionally entitled to be
heard should be heard before a drastic change in status occurs. 184
Exception is made in those emergency situations where immediate
action is required. 185 In the present context, to the extent that a delay engendered by a hearing keeps the suspected mentally retarded
child in the regular classroom, whatever effect his presence has in
slowing down the "regular" children for this additional period of
time is likely to be negligible. Therefore, there is no emergency present in the EMR labeling-placement context, and a hearing before
transfer to an EMR class is appropriate.
Assuming for the moment that an adversary hearing is required
at some point before EMR placement, it must be determined
whether an adversary hearing is constitutionally required prior to
the administration of an IQ test in order to determine if there
exists sufficient evidence to warrant the administering of the test to
a particular child. There is strong evidence that once a child is
tested and scores in the EMR range, the regular teacher, aware of
182. Guadalupe Organization, Inc. v. Tempe Elementary School Dist. No. 3, Civil
No. 71-435-Phx (D. Ariz., Jan. 25, 1972). See note 58 supra.
183. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
184. See Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 152-53 (1941);
Southern Ry. v. Virginia, 290 U.S. 190, 199 (1933).
185. See, e.g., North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908)
(action allowed before constitutionally required hearing where food was about to spoil).
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his supposed handicap, tends to treat him accordingly, even if he is
not placed into an EMR class. 186 On balance, however, this harm is
not sufficient to justify the requirement of an adversary hearing at
this point. Such a requirement would result in the novelty of two
full hearings; even in the area of criminal law, where the strictest
due process safeguards are required, there is no requirement of an
adversary hearing on the question of whether or not the state may
employ a particular investigative measure in a criminal case.
In the criminal law field, however, due process does require a
nonadversarial review of the existing evidence by an impartial tribunal before the police and prosecutorial authorities may engage in
certain "drastic" evidence-gathering measures, such as a physical
search of premises or wiretapping. The existing evidence must demonstrate that there is "probable cause" to believe that the evidence
sought will be found at the place to be searched or "bugged." 187 With
respect to regulatory searches, such as fire, health, or safety inspections, strict "probable cause" is not required, but some evidence
short of this must be reviewed by an impartial tribunal before such
a search may be conducted. 188
It is possible that an analogy can be drawn between the criminal
investigative process of a search and the EMR diagnostic process of
IQ testing; both are "searches" that involve inherent dangers. It can
thus be argued that if due process requires a nonadversarial review
of the existing evidence by an impartial tribunal before authorities
can engage in the former search, then due process should require
the same procedure for the analogous latter search. The pre-IQ testing evidence in the EMR setting is the data derived from personality
tests, social adjustment tests, medical examinations, family background examinations, and personal observations by the diagnostician. The standard for granting permission to administer an IQ
test could be something less than "probable cause" (the standard
used in fire, health, and safety inspections). The impartial reviewing
body could be the same one that reviews the actual placement decision. As in a criminal search case, the hearing need not be a fullblown adversarial trial.
It must be pointed out, however, that the requirement that police
authorities apply for a search warrant derives from the fourth
amendment, which "secures" persons "against unreasonable searches
and seizures" and provides, in effect, that a search or seizure is unreasonable unless conducted upon a warrant based upon "probable
cause" and obtained from a judicial officer who reviews the existing
186. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
187. E.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (wire-tapping); United States v.
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965) (physical search).
188. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle,
387 U.S. 541 (1967).

May 1973]

Comments

1245

evidence.189 Nevertheless, Goldberg v. Kelly190 lends support to the
proposition that the due process clause may require more than one
type of hearing in a noncriminal context. In Kelly, regulations of an
administrative agency (HEW) required a hearing after welfare benefits had been terminated. The Court held that a hearing must be
held before the benefits could be terminated and thus in effect required a due process hearing before and a statutory hearing after
termination. The court stated, however, that the preliminary hearing was required only if benefits were terminated prior to a hearing.101
In the welfare cases harm to the individual can be avoided by
delaying termination of benefits. Therefore, only one hearing need
be required. In the EMR situation, however, harm may result solely
from the administration of the IQ test, because the regular teacher,
if aware of the student's low score, may treat him differently. Because of this initial, unavoidable harm it could be argued that Kelly
and the criminal cases require two hearings in this situation, the
first to be of the limited, nonadversarial type.
Since the due process safeguards that may be required before
an IQ test is given have been examined, the remaining question is
what safeguards are constitutionally mandated in the hearing required prior to placement. As a norm for this determination, the
safeguards outlined by the Supreme Court for the pretermination
hearing required in Kelly will be examined. The welfare hearing is
chosen as a model because in this area the Supreme Court has extensively cataloged the due process requirements in a specific, civil
context.
The first consideration is notice of the impending EMR placement. In dealing with welfare termination, the Supreme Court found
that seven days' notice was sufficient, "although there may be cases
where fairness would require that a longer time be given." 192 A welfare recipient is likely to have most of the rebutting evidence readily
at hand; the recipient himself would be the source of most of it. In
the EMR placement context, however, the typical parent will have
no familiarity with the type of evidence needed to contest the placement decision, nor would such evidence be readily available. A period of notice greater than seven days, it seems, could be required.
As to form of notice, both a letter and personal conference with
a school official should be required. The parent of a minority child
threatened with EMR placement, like a welfare recipient, is likely
189. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
190. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
191. 397 U.S. at 267. If the termination were delayed until after the statutory
hearing, then the preliminary hearing would not have been required. 397 U.S. at 267
n.14.
192. 397 U.S. at 268.
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to suffer from poor education and a lack of awareness. As the Supreme Court recognized in Kelly, the combination of a letter and
conference "is probably the most effective method of communicating" with such persons. 193
The right to counsel in the welfare context was limited to a right
to be represented if the individual chose to retain counsel. 104 Since
the Supreme Court has never extended the right to appointed counsel to a situation where physical incarceration was not a possibility,196
due process probably does not require a right to appointed counsel
in the EMR hearing, despite the figurative incarceration involved
in EMR placement.
Due process might demand, as in Kelly, 196 that the parents have
a right to a personal apearance to state their position, rather than
being limited to written submissions. As the Court recognized in
Kelly, "[w]ritten submissions are an unrealistic option for most recipients, who lack the educational attainment necessary to ·write
effectively and who cannot obtain professional assistance." 197 Moreover, the parents should, possibly, have the right to bring in the
child, for the child himself will often be the best evidence that he is
not retarded.
The requirement of an impartial hearing officer or body is the
very essence of a meaningful opportunity to be heard. This principle
is easier to state than apply, however, and three alternatives readily
present themselves. One would require a court to be the hearing
body.198 The second would require the school authorities to employ
a hearing officer or officers whose sole function is to decide contested
EMR placement cases. 199 The third would allow the school authorities to choose competent hearing officers from among school personnel who are as far removed from the case as possible.200
The Court intimated in Kelly that not every prior involvement
with the case would disqualify an individual from hearing a contested welfare case.201 Such language notwithstanding, it could be
argued that regular school employees should have no part in the
193. 397 U.S. at 268.
194. 397 U.S. at 270.
195. See K. DAVIS, supra note 170, § 8.08, at 205-06.
196. 397 U.S. at 269.
197. 397 U.S. at 269.
198. Cf. State ex rel. Beam v. Fulwiler, 76 Wash. 2d 313, 456 P.2d 322 (1969).
199. Cf. Administrative Procedure Act § 11, 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (1970).
200. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d
807, 813 (2d Cir. 1967).
201. The Court in Kelly found that the hearing body should be impartial but
refused to apply a rigid rule of separation of functions that would disqualify every
member of the agency staff who had some prior involvement with the case. 397 U.S.
at 271.
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hearing process. Justice Jackson once observed, "Men are ... often
bribed by their loyalties and ambitions . . . ." 202 Regular school
personnel have vested interests in such matters as the validity and
efficiency of the testing program. Moreover, they must continue to
maintain retarded classes in order to receive the school district's share
of special funds for the handicapped. School personnel may also feel
an obligation to the "normal" or "fast" students; they might not
want to simplify the course content so as to enable the "slow" children to learn.203
·
Although specially employed hearing officers would be less likely
to be biased than regular school personnel, given the potential harm
involved from misplacement it is submitted that due process might
permit such special personnel to serve only at the hearings preliminary to giving an IQ test. Hearing officers, who would doubtless be
psychologists or special educators, may be subject to bias in that they
might hope to move from that position to a higher one within the
school system. Therefore, only an outside tribunal could meet a
stringent standard of impartiality. But Kelly, which dealt with an
area of governmental disbursement that has been closely scrutinized
by the Supreme Court,204 did not impose these more stringent hearing requirements, so their application to the EMR setting may be
found to be unwarranted.
As to a right of discovery, the Court was not very explicit in
Kelly, although it did cite language from an earlier case that required
disclosure.205 In the EMR setting this may mean that due process
requires that the parents or their representatives have an opportunity
to examine all documents and records prior to the hearing, as well
as during its course. Without such an opportunity, in many instances
the presentation of the child's case could be so hampered as to make
the hearing almost meaningless.
In Kelly it was held that the welfare recipient had a right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. 200 A recent Supreme Court
decision, however, has held that the denial of a claim on the basis of
reports by physicians who have examined a claimant for social security disability benefits will be upheld notwithstanding the absence of
202. United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98, 103 (1951).
203. In addition, as the court recognized in Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ.,
3ll F. Supp. 501, 519-20 (C.D. Cal. 1970), "evidence shows that at least at some schools

there is a tendency among some ••• school personnel to assume that Negro students,
particularly Negroes of poor socio-economic backgrounds, will achieve poorly and to
make low assignments accordingly."
204. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969).
205. 397 U.S. at 270, citing Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959).
206. 397 U.S. at 271. The Court did not appear to require a verbatim transcript
of testimony.
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cross-examination.207 This case may be distinguished from the instant
situation because the Court relied on the fact that the claimant
had a right under the Social Security Act208 to subpoena the physicians who made the reports but had failed to do so within the
prescribed time. 209 In the EMR context, cross-examination gives
the parent and child the opportunity to contest the diagnosis in a
meaningful way.
Finally, the Court in Kelly required that the decision maker state
the reasons for this determination and indicate the evidence on which
he relied; his statement did not, however, need to "amount to a full
opinion or even formal findings of fact and conclusions of law." 210
This requirement should also apply to EMR proceedings.
The foregoing discussion of a child's right to a hearing before
placement into an EMR class has been predicated upon the assumption that commitment to EMR classes in a particular school system
is involuntary. However, when the process of commitment is voluntary-that is, based upon parental consent-the traditional reasons
for the due process safeguard of a hearing seem to vanish.
However, in many cases the "consent" of the parent or guardian
may not be fully informed or meaningful. 211 Although some educational systems undoubtedly require a school official to attempt to
explain the import of the decision to place the child in the retarded
class, it is questionable whether many parents or guardians have the
education or perception to comprehend the immediate and longrange implications of this decision. Second, even in those systems
where an explanation is required before consent, the official charged
with this task might not divulge the kind of exhaustive, objective
data needed by the parent in order to make a knowledgeable decision. Third, even where some explanation is required, it might be
given only after the school authorities have concluded from IQ
scores and other factors that the child is in fact retarded and should
be placed in the retarded class. Given the awe with which many poor
and minority parents view school authorities, their limited education, and the language difficulties especially present when dealing
207. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
208. Social Security Act § 205(d), 42 U.S.C. § 405(d) (1970). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.926
(1972).
209. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 407 (1971).
210. 397 U.S. at 271.
211. In dealing with guilty pleas, the Supreme Court has stated: "[T]o be valid
such a waiver must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the
statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all
other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter.'' Von Moltke v.
Gilles, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1947). This standard probably applies to waivers of consent
in noncriminal cases. See, e.g., Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185-86 (Blackmun, J.), 188-89 (Douglas, J., concurring) (1971).
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with Mexican-American parents, grave doubts exist as to whether a
knowledgeable and meaningful consent can really be given even
after an explanation.
If consent is required for the placement of children into EMR
classes, and the parents later contest that consent in court on the
ground that it was not knowingly and intelligently given, the burden
of proof might shift to the school authorities to demonstrate the
constitutionality of the consent. Precedent is found in Swarb v.
Lennox,212 where the court considered a study that implied that
ninety-six per cent of the persons who had signed consumer contracts containing confession-of-judgment clauses had incomes under
$10,000. Because of this study, the court shifted the burden of proof
to the creditors to demonstrate that this class of consumers understood that such clauses waived their constitutional right to a trial
and authorized their alleged creditors to "confess" the alleged debt. 213
Taking the consent issue even further, an argument can be
made in the instant case that the interests of the parent or guardian
may be entirely different from the interests of the minor child and
that due process, therefore, requires an evaluation of the necessity
of making the stigmatizing placement decision independent of parental consent. One example of how the interests of the child and
parent may diverge is the parent's possible interpretation of the
child's failure to perform well in school as a failure on his part as
a parent. Such a parent may very well wish to have his child officially
labeled mentally retarded because this labeling relieves the parent
of his own guilt feelings; it transfers the "blame" to the child or to
fate. The parent may also have an interest adverse to that of the
child in a situation where the school authorities exert considerable
pressure, either overtly or covertly, to compel the parent to consent
to the placement for "the best interest of the child." The child has
an interest in an uncoerced and informed decision, while the parent
-though he may rationalize his consent as in the child's best interest
-may be primarily concerned with cooperating with school officials
who, to the parents, are authority figures.
Similar considerations have led to the recognition of parental
inability to represent the child in another area of the law. Where the
child has a cause of action for personal injury, selfish concerns may
motivate a parent to accept a settlement. Therefore, the court will
not allow the parent to serve as the child's representative in handling
the claim.214
The final stage in the commitment process at which procedural
safeguards may come into play occurs after a child has actually been
212. 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970), afjd. on other grounds, 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
213. 314 F. Supp. at 1100-01.
214. See, e.g., Rafferty v. Rainey, 292 F. Supp. 152 (E.D. Tenn. 1968).
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placed into an EMR class. Because of the unreliability of methods
used to determine mental retardation and because of the importance
of the individual interests involved, the minimum that due process
may require is periodic review of the initial placement decision. In
Mills v. Board of Education 216 a federal district court so held.

IV.

SUGGESTED SOLUTION

Although it is often stated that bias cannot be eliminated from
IQ tests, 216 there are practical ways to minimize their unreliability
and thus meet possible constitutional objections to their use. For
example, a court could, without impairing an EMR placement process, require that (I) whatever tests are given be administered in
the child's primary language; (2) future tests be developed so as to
minimize bias; (3) examiners of the child's race be used; (4) children
who score higher than two standard deviations below the given test's
norm not be placed into EMR classes unless there is cultural and
adaptive behavior to supplement the test results; (5) before any placement of a minority child occurs because of low test scores there be an
examination of the child's developmental history, cultural background and scholastic achievement; (6) there be a nonadversarial
hearing before test administration and an adversarial hearing before
placement; (7) parents consent to the placement in writing, and the
nature of their consent be a subject of inquiry at the adversarial hearing; (8) there be an annual review of the capabilities of children
placed into EMR classes. In fact, California has already adopted217
and Michigan is in the process of adopting218 similar schemes. Although not a panacea, these procedures, in due process terms, are
reasonably related to proving the appropriateness of EMR placement
for a minority child; in equal protection terms, these procedures are
the most precise and least onerous means of placement. They do not
institutionalize the misplacement of minority children as do the
current procedures, and, moreover, they furnish minimum procedural safeguards.
215. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
216. See, e.g., Charters, Social Class and Intelligence Tests, in SCHOOL CHILDREN IN
THE URBAN SLUMS 75
Roberts ed. 1967); Levine, Aptitude Versus Achievement, 18
Eouc. &: PSYCHOLOGICAL MEASUREMENT 517, 517-19 (1958).
217. CAL. Eouc. CODE §§ 6902.06-.095 (West Supp. 1973). For an application of such a
scheme, see Diana v. State Bd. of Educ., Civil No. C-70 37 RFP (N.D. Cal., Feb. 5,
1970, reopened Oct. 31, 1972).
218. See Mich. State Bd. of Educ. Proposed Code for Special Educ. Programs &:
Services (Draft No. 1, March 13-14, 1973) (formulated under authority conferred by
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 340.10, .252b, .298c, .317a, .318a, .60lb, .613, .772a, .77'Ja
(Supp. 1973)).
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